"Left of the Boom"

"Left of the Boom" is a phrase that General McCrystal used recently in the 'Boots Off the Ground' panel discussed in my last post. I would like to discuss it as it applies to leadership. As an example I will use Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia in 1941, as an example. General McCrystal used it in the context of our response to IEDs when they were first used in Iraq. Initially the response to the threat posed by IEDs was to deploy armored vehicles and secure the area after one was detonated. This allowed us to evacuate casualties and potentially kill or capture any insurgents who might have stayed to create an ambush. However, this did not solve the real problem, IEDs were still killing soldiers, contractors, and civilians, slowing or stopping our convoys, and creating chaos in general.
The solution, General McCrystal said, was to "get ahead of the boom", stop the IEDs before they were detonated. Thus they instituted regular patrols, sniper teams conducting over watch, and other measures that prevented the IEDs from being deployed in the first place.
This is a large and important part of a leader's job. Great leaders must be able to look forward and identify incoming problems and stop them before they happen. This happens at two levels. First, executive leaders are positioned to see the big picture and make substantial changes thereto. In our example, Operation Barbarossa, the freezing cold of the Russian winter represents the 'boom'. German high command knew about the cold, but believed they could make ti to Moscow and defeat the Russian military before the cold effected them too much. Not only did they fail to set realistic goals, they had no contingency plans for if those goals failed. When those two are combined they are fatal. Getting left of the boom for them would have meant either, a) equipping their men and equipment to operate in the cold or b) developing a plan to fall back to prepared positions if the Russian forces remained unbeaten by a certain point.
However, while executive level leaders have the ability to influence the big picture, they often overlook details, or occasionally miss the big picture entirely., which is where mid to lower level leaders come in. It is their responsibility to make the big picture as described by the executive leader happen as best they can ad pass up bits of information or warnings when appropriate. Thus, while mid level leaders must have a general understanding of the big picture, their focus must be on the areas under their control. Lower levels of an organization are often tempted to waste time and energy complaining about the ineptitude of their commanders. While such complaints may often be valid, and valuable in their place, they are often unproductive. The German infantry officer who sent a few messages up the chain and then proceeded to train his men to deal with cold weather would ultimately have more impact than the officer who spent most of his energy complaining to or about higher.
So, take time to get above the crush and grind of now, the things immediately important. A little time each week looking ahead will go a long way to getting left of the boom for you and yours. Even if you are not at the top, getting you and your people out of trouble, even if it isn't as neat and tidy as if higher had done it, will still make a difference, which is what being a leader is all about.


image from The Guardian at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/06/operation-barbarossa-russia-second-world-war

Wiley's "Boots Off the Ground"

With our struggling economy, shrinking national budget, and political gridlock, America has to decide how to effectively use the money and military she has to effect the policy goals she is trying to achieve. Covert Operations apparently promise cheap solutions to big international problem. But are they cheap in the long run and can we depend on their devastating success to continue for the foreseeable future?

Wiley Lecture Series recently hosted 'Boots Off The Ground: A 21st Century American Military', which looked at the role covert operations have and perhaps should fill. Retired Army General Montgomery Meig moderated the discussion between Ambassador Ryan Crocker who served in several countries in the Middle East, Mr. David Sanger a journalist who has focused on our confrontations with rogue states, and General Stan McCrystal, who oversaw U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan and led led JSOC for several years.

Before we can talk about how military forces accomplish their mission, we have to understand what is at the base of their mission. Military force is an arm of political policy. Military action always seeks to achieve a political aim, whether it is the destruction of Nazi aggression or the securing of national interests abroad. Use of Covert Ops should be seen not merely in how it helps us defeat hostile militaries, but in how they help us achieve our national policies at home and abroad.

At the center of the discussion was the benefits and costs of using cover operations in place of conventional forces. There were three specific types of covert operations discussed.

• Drones: They have proven themselves reliable and effective on a wide range of missions. However, in several instances they can cause collateral damage in civilian casualties, which may turn out to make them counterproductive in the long run.
• Cyber Warefare: Bloodless, high tech, and apparently clean, everyone thinks they are very cool. it has a very high potential to be turned back around on us. In 2010 the program Olympic Games malfunctioned and America's cutting edge offensive cyber weapon was broadcast all over the world for everyone to look at and pick apart. Also, leaks in the cyber age dwarf leaks in the Cold War era where files had to be photocopied one page at a time. Now someone can carry out on a flash drive or post on the internet millions of files full of sensitive information. 
• Special Forces. Very effective and precise, America boasts the best overall Special Forces in the world. However, a contributing factor in their success has been a technological gap between them and their targets that is rapidly shrinking. In addition, special forces are primarily useful to remove negative forces opposing our national strategy. They have limited usefulness in nation building or projecting positive influence that our policies may call for. 

America wants to project its influence around the world. While many are opposed to us swinging around the world police bludgeon, there are always areas we are expected to deal with, whether it is facilitating peace talks and general stability in the Middle East or South America, or Nuclear Proliferation treaties, convention foces deployed and with the willingness to be deployed are vital. Iraq could not have been stabilized and rebuilt without the surge of 2007 which put large numbers of conventional troops on the ground. 

Also, we have not yet faced an opponent with similar Covert capabilities. The targets we have hit so successfully are not too dissimilar from our own structures of command and control. What will happen to an american command and control post when a  North Korean or Chinese Spec Ops team knocks out the power? How will we prevent that from happening, and how are we going to develop contingencies for when it does? In 1960 we believed that air to air combat would be decided with high tech missiles and thus a gun was not necessary. The F-4E was modified with a 20mm gun not long after earlier designs first saw combat. we cannot rely on new high tech equipment to the detriment of conventional equipment. 

A modern military must balance conventional with covert forces in the same way the F-4 had to balance its armament. Not only will our technological edge shrink, but everyone is trying to figure out how to beat the army we have. We cannot sit content with the fact that we have gotten ahead of the curve with covert ops. We must continue to look for the next curve and figure out how to win the next conflict before it is fought and we learn the rules have changed while we rested on our superiority. 

We will always need a conventional force that is capable of conducting operations like the Surge which put boots on the ground and enforce order. Covert Operations are devastating as supporting arms of broader policy and strategy, but they need other supports to create that devastating effect.